

VZCZCXRO5114
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0708 0791237
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201237Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1962
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000708

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2016
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [ER](#) [SU](#)
SUBJECT: SPLM VIEW OF THE GNU-EAST NEGOTIATIONS

REF: KHARTOUM 00941

Classified By: P/E Chief Eric Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Poloff spoke with Malik Agar, Minister of Investment and SPLM member of the GNU-East negotiating team about the stalemate in negotiations between the GNU and the Eastern Front. Agar said the GNU needed to accomplish four things: acknowledge the marginalization of the East, present a negotiating package for the East, improve the Sudanese-Eritrean relationship, and include Eritrea in negotiations.

¶2. (C) Agar commented that he could not speak for the GNU, only for the SPLM, as he had not met with Kamal Obeid, National Congress Party (NCP) representative to the East, since their first meeting in mid-February. Agar said his first and only meeting with the NCP demonstrated that it was not serious about negotiating with the Eastern Front; the NCP had no package to offer, and did not acknowledge there was a problem in the East. Instead, the NCP would negotiate solely due to international pressure. At the NCP meeting, Agar said he questioned the ability of Libya to broker an agreement and its decision to exclude Eritrea from the process. He suggested the NCP use the Blue Nile/South Kordofan peace agreement as a model, and tailor the agreement to the needs of the East. This suggestion, however, was rejected.

SPLM Troop Withdrawal from the East

¶3. (C) According to Agar, the SPLM has delayed withdrawing troops from Hamesh Koreib due to logistical difficulties. Agar denied rumors that the SPLM would not withdraw from Hamesh Koreib until the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) withdrew from the South; however, he did add that the SAF was withdrawing its troops unconventionally, soldier by soldier, instead of platoon by platoon, making it difficult to track the exact numbers of SAF troops withdrawing from the South. Furthermore, if there were no political solution to the East, the SPLM might remain there to pressure the NCP to solve the East politically rather than militarily.

¶4. (C) Comment: Since February, Poloff and the UN have attempted in vain to contact Kamal Obeid, who so far has demonstrated an unwillingness to speak with the international community. Post will continue to try to contact Obeid to discuss the next steps for resolving the situation of Sudan's East.
STEINFELD